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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the "structured whole" hypothesis 
of cognitive-moral developmental theory which suggests 
that there is a general factor of moral stage crosscutting 
responses to all moral dilemmas which results in a 
stage-consistent pattern of responses on instruments 
assessing moral development. In order to assess the 
effect of the content of moral dilemmas the Defining 
Issues Test (DIT) was administered to 300 undergraduate 
students at a mid-sized state university. Results suggest 
that dilemmas differentially "pull for" or exclude certain 
levels of moral reasoning providing no support for the 
"structured whole" hypothesis of cognitive moral develop-
ment theory. Additional research in the following three 
areas is necessary in order that the underlying assump-
tions of cognitive developmental theory be further 
investigated: determination of the test-retest relia-
bility of DIT stage scores, profile analyses of subjects' 
responses on the DIT, and evaluation of the effects of 
both subject and dilemma variables on DIT responses. 
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CHAPTER I 
Statement of the Problem 
1 
Moral judgment is a psychological construct which was 
first investigated systematically by Jean Piaget in 1932. 
According to Piaget, the term moral judgment refers to an 
individual's understanding of the rules of justice and 
fairness by which a society functions. (Piaget, 1965). 
One aspect of the research in the area of moral 
judgment has focused upon a person's reasoning in response 
to hypothetical moral dilemmas. A moral dilemma is an 
ambiguous conflict situation which has several possible 
outcomes. Subjects are presented with the dilemma and 
asked what is the "correct" course of action to be 
followed to solve the dilemma. The subject is then 
required to justify or explain why a particular solution 
to the moral dilemma was selected. The pattern of 
responses offered by the individual is then used to 
determine and evaluate moral judgment level. 
In evaluating an individual's responses to moral 
dilemmas, two competing theoretical perspectives can be 
identified (Edwards, 1982). Cognitive developmental 
theories postulate the existence of biologically deter-
mined patterns of thought that are influenced by learning 
and experience (Kohlberg, 1969, 1971). Kohlberg, the most 
influential of the cognitive developmental theorists, 
2 
suggests a model wherein moral judgment is described as a 
''typological scheme describing general stages of moral 
thought that can be defined independently of the specific 
content of particular moral decisions or actions" 
(Kohlberg, 1980, p. 20). Further, these patterns of 
thought, i.e., stages, are internally consistent and occur 
in invariant sequence. Situational theorists, in con-
trast, suggest that moral reasoning is the result of the 
interaction between the situational factors and learning 
experiences to which the reasoner has been exposed. 
Simpson (1974), a major proponent of the situational 
paradigm, suggests that individuals are not predisposed to 
think in certain ways due to innate biological struc-
tures. Rather, it is the content of the particular 
dilemma which brings culturally learned responses to bear 
on moral judgments. 
In predicting how a subject will respond to .moral 
dilemma situations, the cognitive developmentalist will 
insist that the individual will produce similar moral 
reasoning level responses to diverse situations. Speci-
fically, the individual will respond in a manner that is 
stage typical and consistent across situations. This 
cognitive-developmental idea of stage unity has been 
labeled by Kohlberg as the principle of structured wholes 
and as such forms an underlying tenet of cognitive moral 
developmental theory. Situational theorists, on the other 
3 
hand, suggest that situational contingencies will be the 
primary influence on responses to moral dilemmas, wherein 
situational contingencies are defined as the total array 
of psychologically meaningful elements impinging upon the 
individual at any particular time. Thus, responses to 
diverse moral dilemmas can evoke widely varying patterns 
of moral reasoning from the individual. Moral judgments 
are not the product of differentially developed thought 
processes but rather are the result of situational factors. 
It is the purpose of this study to empirically 
investigate the structured whole hypothesis of the 
cognitive-moral developmental approach. An examination of 
this hypothesis allows evaluation of the situational and 
cognitive developmental approaches. If it is found that 
diverse moral dilemmas evoke widely varying levels of 
moral reasoning within individuals, i.e., that level of 
moral reasoning is not consistent across situations as 
hypothesized by cognitive-developmentalists, then the 
necessity of considering the effects of situational 
contingencies or other subject variables on moral reason-
ing will be underscored. 
On the other hand, if individuals demonstrate 
consistent patterns of moral reasoning across diverse 
moral dilemmas, an underlying tenet of cognitive develop-
mental theory will be supported. Thus, the intent of this 
research is to contribute to the empirical validation of 
4 
cognitive developmental theory by testing the hypothesis 
of structured wholes, i.e., the presence of consistency of 
moral reasoning by an individual across diverse dilemmas. 
CHAPTER II 
Background Theory and Research 
The Cognitive Developmental Paradigm 
5 
The cognitive developmental paradigm is a major 
theoretical framework for the conceptualization of moral 
development. Within this framework, two fundamental 
concepts can be identified which can be said to define the 
cognitive developmental approach. 
The first of these is that an individual's percep-
tions of reality are cognitively constructed. The result 
of these constructions are organized patterns or struc-
tures of thought which allow the individual to interpret 
reality. These structures, which change as the individual 
develops, represent qualitative rather than quantitative 
organizations of thought processes. 
The second fundamental concept is that developmental 
stages evolve or change as the result of the reorganiza-
tion of existing cognitive structures. New stages, which 
are the result of this reorganization, consist of quali-
tatively new and different underlying cognitive struc-
tures. Developmental change is, therefore, a progression 
in which earlier cognitive structures are elaborated to 
accommodate greater complexity in a subject's experience. 
Three major theorists, Jean Piaget, Lawrence 
Kohlberg, and James Rest have utilized the cognitive 
developmental approach to explain moral reasoning and its 
development. This review will now examine the work of 
these theorists. 
Piaget's Simple Two-Stage Model of Moral Reasoning 
Piaget's landmark 1932 work, Th e Moral Judgment of 
the Child, first discussed the concept of moral judgment. 
In this work, Piaget defined moral judgment as an under-
standing of the rules of justice and fairness by which a 
society functions (Piaget, 1965). Moral development, in 
cognitive-developmental terms, refers to the process by 
which the innate biologically-determined cognitive 
structures which control and define moral judgment evolve 
in the individual. For Piaget, the components of cogni-
tive abilities result from an interaction between innate 
physiologically-based predispositions and experience 
(Brainerd, 1978). 
6 
Piaget hypothesized a two-stage model of moral 
judgment. According to this model, an individual at 
different ages will exhibit one of two qualitatively 
different patterns of thought when dealing with situations 
that require moral reasoning. The evolution of these 
thought patterns is due to developmental processes. 
Piaget suggests that the changes in an individual's 
reasoning reflect qualitative rather than quantitative 
changes in cognitive structures. The theory has been 
7 
classified as a disjunctive structural theory since its 
focus is upon qualitative rather than quantitative changes 
in cognitive structures. 
The two stages of morality as hypothesized by Piaget 
(1965) are: 
1. Heteronomous Morality: The stage of heterono-
mous morality (ages 6-10) represents the very earliest 
stage of development wherein the child exhibits conscious-
ness or awareness of rules. This stage of morality, also 
known as the morality of constraint, results from the 
interaction of two factors -- cognitive immaturity and 
unilateral emotional respect for adults. These two 
factors cause the child to externalize moral rules and to 
treat these rules as unchangeable absolutes. However, as 
the child is exposed to reciprocal social interactions and 
conditions of mutual respect and equality, the second ·and 
terminal Piagetian stage of morality develops. 
2. Cooperative Morality: The stage of the morality 
of cooperation represents the highest level of Piagetian 
moral reasoning (onset at ages 10-14). The individual who 
exhibits the morality of cooperation views rules as 
flexible and modifiable. Rules are viewed as a way to 
express the rights and responsibilities of society's 
members. 
Piaget suggests that all children will ultimately 
progress from a premoral stage to the stage of the 
8 
morality of cooperation unless development is retarded or 
impeded by severe social deprivation. Piaget (1965) 
maintains that under conditions of mutual respect and 
equality in social interchange, the developing mind cannot 
help corning to regard the principle of cooperation as "an 
imminent condition of social relationships." 
Kohlberg's Simple Six-Stage Model of Moral ·Reasoning 
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral 
reasoning is an elaboration of Piaget's stage approach to 
moral development wherein moral development is also 
described as a series of stages that represent succes-
sively differentiated, more complex and more highly 
integrated patterns of thought. While Piaget was very 
cautious and nonspecific about the characteristics of 
moral reasoning stages, Kohlberg has very rigorously 
defined the concept of stage as it relates to moral 
judgment (Rest, 1979). Kohlberg notes that moral judgment 
stages are qualitative descriptors of cognitive processes 
which exhibit stage unity, i.e., structured wholes; 
step-by-step invariant sequence and lend themselves 
error-free, context-independent assessment. Thus, this 
model is . presented as a · "typological scheme describing 
general stages of moral thought that can be defined 
independently of the specific content of particular moral 
decisions or actions" (Kohlberg, 1980, p. 20). Kohlberg 
justifies his theory as a typological scheme because "67 
percent of most peoples' thinking is at a single stage 
regardless of the moral dilemma involved" (Kohlberg, 
1980, p. 21) and elaborates a theory of morality in which 
the acquisition of higher levels of reasoning are depen-
dent upon the assimilation and reorganization of lower 
levels of thought. 
Kohlberg hypothesizes three levels and six stages of 
moral reasoning. In the pre-conventional level, level I, 
moral value is defined in terms external to the indivi-
dual. Within the pre-conventional level, Stage 1 defines 
goodness in terms of the physical consequences of the 
9 
action. In Stage 2, an act is characterized as good if it 
produces what is wanted by the actor from others. At the 
conventional level, level II, moral value resides in the 
individual performing good or expected roles. Within · the 
conventional level, Stage 3 represents conformity to the 
expectations of others, primarily, while Stage 4 repre-
sents conformity to the rules of established authority. 
Post-conventional moral development involves goodness as 
defined independent of the authority invested in persons 
as groups. Stage 5 recognizes that social contracts are 
modifiable to meet the needs of social utility. Stage 6 
morality is based upon the autonomous functioning of 
conscience in accordance with the abstract principles of 
justice, equality, reciprocity and the respect of human 
10 
beings as individuals. A summary characterization of . 
Kohlberg's model is presented in Table 1 , 
Table 1 
Lawrence Kohlberg's Classification of Moral Judgment into 




Basis of Moral Judgment 
Moral value resided in 
external, quasiphysical 
happenings, in bad acts, 
or in quasiphysical needs 
rather than in persons 
and standards. 
Moral value resides in 
performing good or right 
roles, in maintaining the 
conventional order and 
the expectancies of 
others. 
Stages of Development 
Stage 1: Obedience and 
punishment orientation. 
Egocentric deference to 
superior power or pres-
tige, or a trouble-
avoiding set. Objec-
tive responsibility. 
Stage 2: Naively 
egoistic orientation. 
Right action is that 
instrumentally satis-
fying the self's needs 
and occasionally 
others'. Awareness of 
relativism of value to 




change and reciprocity. 
Stage 3: Good-boy ori-
entation. Orientation 
to approval and to 
pleasing and helping 
others. Conformity to 
stereotypical images 
of majority or natural 
role behavior, and 
judgment by intentions. 
Stage 4: Authority 
and social-order 
maintaining orienta-
tion. Orientation to 
"doing duty" and to 
showin~ respect for 
authority and main-
taining the given 
III Moral value resides in 
conformity by the self 
to shared or sharable 
standards, rights, or 
duties. 
11 
social order for its 
own sake. Regard for 
earned expectations of 
others. 
Stage 5: Contractual 
legalistic orientation. 
Recognition of an arbi-
trary element or start-
ing point in rules or 
expectations for the 
sake of agreement. 
Duty defined in terms 
of contract, general 
avoidance of violation 
of the will or rights 
of others, and major-
ity will and welfare. 
Stage 6: Conscience 
or principle orienta-
tion. Orientation not 
only to actually 
ordained social rules 
but to principles of 
choice involving 
appeal to logical 
universality and 
consistency. Orienta-
tion to conscience as 
a directing agent -and 
to mutual respect and 
trust. 
Note. From "Moral and Religious . Education and the Public 
Schools: A Developmental View." In T. Sizer (Ed.), 
Religion and Public Education (p. 171) by L. Kohlberg, 
1967, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
The model of moral judgment presented by Kohlberg has 
been described as a direct elaboration of and extrapola-
tion from Piaget's simple two-stage model developed in 
response to perceived inadequacies in Piaget's model. 
Kohlberg subdivided, reorganized and redefined the 
12 
Piagetian stages in order that they might be better 
representations of cognitive developmental theory. 
Specifically, Kohlberg defined moral reasoning stages such 
that they met the strict stage criteria of cognitive 
developmental theory and, in addition, extended the theory 
from childhood through adulthood. 
Rest's Complex Stage Model of Moral Reasoning 
The simple stage models of Piaget and Kohlberg 
launched initial research efforts in studying moral 
development. As studies have been completed and a 
significant body of findings has become available for 
scrutiny, several serious and consistent problems have 
been identified. Rest (1979), in an extensive review of 
the moral development literature points out four inconsis-
tencies which seriously threaten the validity of the 
simple stage model approach. Two of these identify 
theoretical issues while the remainder specify primarily 
methodological problems in the assessment of moral 
judgment. 
a. Theoretical problems in the assessment of moral 
judgment: 
1. The lack of decalage across content 
domains. Both Piagetian and Kohlbergian theory suggest a 
subject should exhibit the presence of a certain cognitive 
skill or moral development stage across all content 
13 
domains. For example, once a subject completes concrete 
operations, he/she consistently conserves length, mass, 
weight, etc. Similarly, according to Rest, once a subject 
has reached a given stage of moral reasoning, this stage 
should be evidenced in all situations. Rest notes that 
a) " .•• constituent counterparts to conservation of mass, 
weight or transitivity in Piaget's concrete operations" 
(Rest, 1979, p. 57) have not been identified and b) even 
Kohlberg's own research suggests that for any given 
subject, stage scores will be mixed across several moral 
dilemmas. 
2. Subject fluctuation. Rest argues that the 
acquisition of a given stage of moral reasoning is not an 
all-or-none matter. According to Rest, subjects' moral 
development "structures have a probabilistic character, 
appearing now in evidence, now absent" (Flavell & 
Wohl will, 1969, p. 99). As a result of the "probabilistic 
nature of moral reasoning structures, it is necessary to 
have both a quantitative and qualitative measure of such 
structures. The qualitative measure represents into what 
stage a subject's reasoning may be classified, while the 
quantitative measure assesses the degree to which a 
subject is demonstrating a given stage. 
b. Methodological problems in the assessment of 
moral judgment: 
14 
1. Inconsistencies in stage classification due 
to test characteristics: Rest points out that several 
researchers have noted that the specific characteristics 
of the assessment instrument can significantly affect the 
manner in which a subject organizes responses. For 
example, differences in level of response are evident when 
the relevance of story cues or the degree of familiarity a 
subject has with the story are manipulated (Rest, 1979). 
As a result, the classification of a subject's level of 
moral reasoning may vary due to the test characteristics. 
2. Discrepancies in stage scores due to 
response mode: Several researchers have pointed out that 
the clinical interview, which is an often used strategy of 
both Piagetian and Kohlbergian researchers, may seriously 
underestimate the cognitive skills of the subject. Verbal 
expressivity may function as an intervening variable, and 
as a result the reliability of the attained stage score 
may be questioned. 
Rest points out that if different response modes 
yield discrepant stage estimates, the concept of "having a 
structure" must be examined more carefully. Rest suggests 
that it may be possible to "have a structure at different 
levels." For example, a subject may first have a struc-
ture such that it may be made manifest non-verbally; only 
after additional maturation will the subject be able to 
15 
exhibit the structure verbally. This type of discussion 
further calls into question the earlier "all-or-none" view 
of both cognitive and moral development. 
Rest has developed a model of moral development which 
incorporates solutions to the four above-cited anomalies 
in the moral development literature. Rest begins with 
Kohlberg's formulation (a summary of Rest's stages are 
presented in Table 2) but adds two important modifications: 
1. Moral development is characterized both quali-
tatively and quantitatively. Qualitative descriptions 
define different types, i.e., stage of moral reasoning 
while quantitative descriptions define the degree to which 
different structures are present. 
2. The presence of a step-by-step developmental 
sequence is questioned due to the obvious presence of 
stage mixtures in subjects' responses. Consequently, · the 
presence of a complex stage model is hypothesized wherein 
a subject may evidence reasoning at several different 
levels at any given point in time. Figure l depicts the 
kind of non-monotone response patterns that might be 
assumed to relate ordered response types to an underlying 
developmental dimension when those response types are part 




A B C D E F 
Development --"!•► 
Figure 1. The complex stage model. A disjunctive scale 
formed by the relative usage of six different stages 
across development. 
Note. From Development in Judging Moral Issues (p. 224) 
by J.R. Rest, 1969, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Table 2 
James Rest's Classification of Moral Judgment into Levels 
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Moral Rights and 
Responsibilities 











stood to have 
his own inter-
ests, an ex-




cal role taking, 
individuals at-
tain a mutual 
understanding 
about each other 
and the on-going 
pattern of their 
interactions. 
All members of 
society know 
what is expected 







ized for making 






If each party 
sees something 
to gain in an ex-












and wants of the 












follow the law 
and do his 
particular job, 
anticipating that 
other people will 




vised so that 
they reflect the 
general will of 
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told. 




"Let ' s make a 
deal. " 




nice, and kind, 
and you'll get 
along with 
people." 
The morality of 
law and duty to 
the social 
order: "Every-
one in society 
is obligated and 
protected by the 
law." 
The morality of 
society consen-






















the people, at 
the same time in-
suring certain 
basic rights to 
all. With each 
person having a 
say in the deci-
sion process, 
each will see 
that his inter-
ests are maxim-
ized while at 
the same time 
having a basis 
for making claims 
on other people. 
A scheme of coop-
eration that neg-
ates or neutral-









to each member so 
that any deviation 
from these rules 
would advantage 
some members at 
the expense of 
others. 
rangements are 
agreed to by due 
process pro-
cedures." 









Note. From Development in Judging Moral Issues (pp. 
22-23) by J.R. Rest, 1979, Minneapolis: U9iversity of 
Minnesota Press. 
As Table 2 jndicates, Rest's model describes theore-
tically the assumed understanding at each stage of two 
factors underlying moral development, i.e., concepts of 
how expectations about each other's actions are coordi-
nated, known and shared; and concepts about how an 
equilibrium or balance of interests of people in a 
cooperating group is achieved. These two factors deter-
mine the central concept for assigning moral rights and 
responsibility and give logical unity to the various 
characteristics of people's moral judgments. 
Development, as described by the complex stage model, 
is sequential as well as hierarchical wherein development 
is described as a continuous rather than discrete pro-
cess. Within this model, a subject is hypothesized to 
exhibit a developmental profile rather unitary stage 
behavior. Further, this profile is hypothesized to be 
consistently evident across dilemmas. 
19 
In a further attempt to deal with the empirical 
inconsistencies in assessment of moral reasoning due to 
methodological difficulties, Rest and his associates have 
developed an objective measure of cognitive moral judgment 
which offers several advantages over Kohlberg's methodo-
logy including the minimization of variance in stage 
scores due to verbal expressivity; objective scoring 
resulting in the minimization of scorer bias; the calcu-
lation of a continuous (vs. discrete) index (i.e., the 
P-score) to represent a subject's moral judgment level 
(Rest, 1974). 
Rest's instrument, the Defining Issues Test (DIT), 
(see Appendix B) requires that the subject evaluate 
20 
various issues representing thinking at the six levels of 
moral reasoning. As such, the DIT is a recognition rather 
than a production task. While Kohlberg's procedure 
requires the examiner to classify a subject's responses 
according to a scoring guide, the DIT requires the subject 
to rate his own responses. As a result, objective machine 
scoring is possible. While it is not appropriate to use 
the DIT to predict scores on Kohlberg's test, the DIT is a 
useful research tool to investigate questions aoout 
cognitive moral development. 
The Concept of Stage in Moral Development Theory 
The work of Piaget, Kohlberg and Rest present a 
theory of moral judgment in which the concept of stage 
plays a vital role. According to Piaget, the concept of 
stage" .•. refers to a mode pattern or constellation of 
behavior (or dispositions toward behavior) that seem to 
characterize some definable point in the child's life" 
(Flavell & Wohlwill, 1969, p. 91). Stages within this 
paradigm satisfy a set of well-defined criteria. These 
criteria for cognitive development are defined in Piaget's 
work The General Problem of the Psycho-Biological Develop-
ment of the Child (Piaget, 1965). 
1. Qualitative descriptors: 
Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in 
children's modes of thinking or of solving the same 
problem at different stages. 
2. Step-by-step invariant sequence: 
These different modes of thought form an invariant 
sequence, order or succession in individual development. 
While cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop 
development, they do not change its sequence. 
3. Stage unity: 
Each of these different and sequential modes of 
thought forms a "structured whole." A given stage-re-
sponse on a task does not just represent a specific 
response determined by knowledge and familiarity with that 
task of tasks similar to it; rather it represents an 
underlying thought organization. 
4. Hierarchical integration: 
Cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations. 
Stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and 
integrated structures to fulfill a common function. 
These four criteria define the cornerstones upon 
which the framework of cognitive moral development theory 
is laid. Any attempt at empirical validation of cognitive 
moral developmental theory must first establish the 
relationship and validity of these four underlying 
assumptions as they apply to moral reasoning. 
Kohlberg's model of moral reasoning interprets three 
of these four criteria -- qualitative descriptors, 
step-by-step invariant sequence, stage unity -- quite 
rigorously. 
21 
1. Qualitative descriptors: Kohlberg holds that 
stages describe qualitative states. But in addition, he 
argues that it is inappropriate to quantitatively specify 
"amounts" of a stage. Kohlberg stages, "Structural theory 
does not treat any change in structural competence unless 
the change is evident in a qualitatively new pattern of 
response" (Kohlberg 1973, p. 181). 
2. Stage unity: For Kohlberg, the concept of stage 
unity or structured whole implies "conservation and other 
logical operations should appear as a logical and empiri-
cally related cluster of responses in development." 
(Kohlberg, 1969, p. 353) Thus, " ... individuals should be 
consistently at a stage unless they are in transition to 
the next stage ... " (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 353). This allows 
only that a subject will exhibit a single stage or a stage 
plus one in moral reasoning. 
22 
A graphic presentation of these aspects of simple 
stage theory are presented in Figure 2. From Figure 2 the 
following characteristics of the simple stage model are in 
evidence: 
a. Each stage has a turn at predominance in 
use over other stages and each stage peaks at 100% usage. 
b. The only stage mixture that can occur is 
between adjacent stages. 
c. Stages are evenly spaced across development. 
100 
Stage l Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 --- ---I ' I ' I \ I ' I ' I ' I ' I ' L..J 75 I ' I ' V, => I ' I ' I ' I ' L..J I ' I ' (.!) ' I ' < 50 ~ ' V') I ' I ' # I ' 25 I ' I ' I ' I ' I ' 0 I ' 
DEVELOPMENT ~ 
Figure 2. Graphic presentation of the simple stage model. 
Note. From Development in Judging Moral Issues (p. 52) by 
J.R. Rest, 1979, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
3. Step-by-step invariant sequence: Kohlberg 
states "Stage theory holds that every single individual, 
studied longitudinally, should only move one step at a 
time through the stage sequence and always in the same 
order (Kohlberg et al., 1976). Thus, stage mixture or 
regression is specifically forbidden by Kohlberg. 
Rest, in contrast to the rigorous application of 
Piagetian stage criteria suggests some modification to 
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these criteria which allows for a better empirical fit of 
the theory with extant data. Specifically, Rest suggests 
the following: 
1. The idea that the existence of a stage is an 
"all or nothing" affair is incorrect. Developmental 
stages must be characterized both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. Rest states" the question of develop-
mental assessment should not be 'What stage is a person 
in?' but rather 'To what extent does a person manifest the 
various types of organizations, (i.e., stages) of think-
ing" (Rest, 1976, p. 35). 
2. The notion of step-by-step invariant sequence is 
not supported by the current research. Consequently, 
stage movement may be more appropriately thought of as 
quantitative organizational advance. That is the amount 
of various stages present in subjects' responses change in 
a complimentary fashion. For example, a subject may move 
to "advanced" levels of Stage 3, "moderate" levels of 
Stage 4 and to "primary" levels of Stage 5. 
p. 65). 
( Rest , 197 9 , 
Figure 5 presents a graphic representation of Rest's 
conceptualization of developmental change. In this 
conceptualization a developmental order is evident in 







Figure 5. Graphic presentation of a complex stage model. 
Note. From Development in Judging Moral Issues (p. 66) by 
J.R. Rest, 1979, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Of the four characteristics of cognitive developmen-
tal theory discussed, the criterion of stage unity or 
structured whole is considered by both Piaget and Kohlberg 
to be the central criterion of structural stages (Piaget, 
1960; Kohlberg, 1984). For Kohlberg structured wholeness 
refers to the 
.•• conception of an underlying thought organi-
zation that determines responses to tasks that 
are not manifestly similar. The general 
implication of this conception is that indivi-
duals' thinking will be manifested at a single 
dominant stage when observed across instances of 
varying content, though the presence or usage of 
the stage adjacent to the dominant stage may 
also be expected. 
(Colby, Gibbs & 
Liberman, 1983) 
For Rest, this concept implies that subjects will 
demonstrate a consistent pattern of stage level responses 
across dilemmas of varying content. 
As noted, the concept of stage unity is a central 
criterion upon which cognitive moral development theory is 
based. As such, validation of moral development theory is 
contingent upon the empirical validation of this concept. 
The Situational Paradigm 
While cognitive development theories of moral 
judgment represent a much used paradigm in the field, 
proponents of social psychology offer alternative explana-
tions for behavior and reasoning in and about moral 
dilemmas. The social psychologist suggests that subjects 
are the products of their environment. Behaviors and 
consequently reasoning vary according to the environmental 
pressures impinging upon the subject. 
The work of Elizabeth Simpson (1974) states succinct-
ly the position of proponents of such situational theor-
ists. Simpson suggests that moral developmental levels 
are determined by a combination of environmental and 
26 
cultural influences. She suggests that observed differ-
ences in subjects' moral judgments are not the product of 
differentially developed thought processes but rather the 
effect of situational factors. For her, it is the content 
of the particular situation, i.e., dilemma, which brings 
culturally learned responses to bear on moral judgments. 
Simpson's work is a logical extension and culmination 
of the work of several early researchers who examined 
variables hypothesized to have an effect upon moral 
judgment and/or behavior. Medinnus (1959) and Magowan and 
Lee (1970) found that familiarity with the situation 
within which the moral dilemma is posed exerts a direct 
influence on moral judgments with more "mature" judgments 
elicited in familiar situations. Hartshorne and May 
(1928), in a series of classic studies examining cheating 
behaviors, found that honesty and deceit were not unified 
character traits but rather situation specific, i.e., most 
children will deceive in certain situations but not in 
others. A third line of research within the situational 
paradigm has examined the effect of perceived consequences 
upon moral reasoning or behavior. Vitro (1969) found that 
when students believed a test was important and would 
affect their course grade; they were more likely to cheat 
than when they believed the test was unimportant. In a 
similar vein, Plummer (1983) attempted to examine system-
atically the effect of situational variables on moral 
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reasoning. He found that the severity of the consequences 
experienced by the actor in a moral dilemma affected the 
level of moral reasoning offered by subjects. Sobesky 
(1983), in a study assessing the interaction between moral 
development level of subjects and negative consequences, 
also found that the consequences for the actor in a moral 
dilemma influenced both moral judgment and moral thought. 
Empirical Findings 
In reviewing the literature that addresses the 
concept of stage unity, one can identify very few studies 
which assess the presence of or the degree of consistency 
in subjects' responses. 
In moral judgment research using the Piagetian stage 
dimensions of immanent justice, objective responsibility, 
retributive justice and expiatory punishment, Hoffman 
(1970) in an extensive review of the literature concludes 
that there is no evidence for consistency across various 
concepts. In contrast Johnson (1972) reports consistency 
across these dimensions. Neither the work of Hoffman nor 
Johnson specifically addresses the overall presence of 
stage consistency in subjects' responses. 
In moral judgment research based on Kohlbergian 
stages, the issue of stage consistency appears to be 
related to the scoring system employed to stage type 
subjects' responses. In Kohlberg's earlier scoring 
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subjects' responses. In Kohlberg's earlier scoring 
system, the evidence of stage mixture appears clear. 
Kohlberg (1969) reported that 47% of a subject's responses 
were in the predominant stage. Employing a scoring system 
developed in 1978, Colby et al. (1979) reported that 67% 
of the responses were in a subject's predominant stage. 
Several researchers have also suggested that the 
specific type of testing materials, the specific instruc-
tions or procedures used may significantly affect the way 
in which subjects organize their responses. 
Flavell and Wohlwill (1969), reviewing the literature 
examining test characteristics, conclude that "the 
stimulus materials and their familiarity, the manner of 
presentation of the relevant information and the amount of 
irrelevant information" (p. 99) presented can signifi-
cantly affect subjects' responses. 
In the moral judgment literature, several investi-
gators have examined the effect of test characteristics on 
the two-stage model of Piaget. These studies have 
suggested that many kinds of test characteristics can 
affect the type of reasoning offered by subjects in 
response to Piagetian dilemmas. These studies are 
summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Studies Investigating the Effects of Test 
Characteristics on Piagetian Dilemmas 
Study and Sample 
Baldwin (1970) 
Bug & Cross 
(1975) 




Chandler et al. 
(1973) 
Collins et al. 
(1974) 
Irwin & Moore 
(1971) 




Comparison of two 
Piagetian concepts 








Verbal vs. visual 
presentation 
Age used as a 
variable 
Story actors 







ferences in onset 
of acquisition 
Significant in-
crease of level 




crease of level 









crease of level 




Using the Kohlbergian paradigm, Liebermann (1971) 
reported that the dilemmas included in the 1958 version 
elicited differential responses from subjects. Leming 
(1975) reports that a set of "practical" moral dilemmas 
elicited different stage responses than Kohlberg ' s set. 
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Crockenberg and Nicolayev (1977) also found discrepancies 
between Kohlberg's Form A and Form B. Colby (1979), 
however, reports a correlation of .84 between forms and 
85% agreement within a half stage. McGeorge (1974) also 
reports significant variation between responses of forty 
12-year old boys and 23 university students. Both of 
McGeorge's studies may be criticized because of extremely 
small sample size. In a similar vein, Plummer (1982) also 
found stage mixture in a sample of 70 college sophomores. 
In examining the literature employing Rest's complex 
stage model no study could be identified which specifi-
cally addressed the question of consistency of subjects' 
responses across dilemmas. 
In an extension of his 1982 work, Plummer (1983) 
examined systematically the effect of situational vari-
ables on moral reasoning. He found that the severity of 
the consequences experienced by the actor in the moral 
dilemma affected the level. 
Research Question 
The issue examined in this research is the validity 
of the cognitive developmental assumption of stage unity, 
i.e., "structured wholes." Cognitive moral developmental 
theory posits that a subject will demonstrate a consistent 
level of moral reasoning across dilemmas of varying 
content. The simple stage theorist holds that a subject 
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will exhibit a single stage or a single stage plus one (if 
the subject is in transition) in responding to moral 
dilemmas. Neither stage mixture nor stage regression is 
permitted. Similarly, the complex stage theorist will 
maintain that while stage mixture is likely, the general 
pattern (percentages of stages exhibited) of responses 
will be consistent across dilemmas. That is, while a 
single dilemma is likely to elicit more than one level of 
reasoning and a subject's moral reasoning is most accur-
ately described using both quantitative and qualitative 
descriptors, the percentages of stage usage should remain 
generally consistent across dilemmas of varying story 
content. Thus, the question addressed by this research 
is: do subjects exhibit a consistent level of moral 
reasoning or pattern of levels of moral reasoning when 





The 300 students who served as subjects for this 
study were volunteers from an introductory level psycho-
logy course at a mid-sized state university. The students 
enrolled in this course generally are undergraduates who 
range in age from 18 to 24. Early in the semester, prior 
to any lectures on cognitive or moral development theory, 
volunteers were solicited. All subjects who participated 
in the study were awarded extra points on their final 
course grade. 
This study was reviewed and approved by the Institu-
tional Review Board at the University of Rhode Island. 
(See Appendix A.) Informed consent of subjects was 
obtained prior to subjects' participation and subjects 
were de-briefed at the conclusion of this project. 
Instruments 
Defining Issues Test (DIT). The DIT, designed by 
Rest, (1979) (see Appendix B) is a measure of cogni-
tive-moral development which" ... attempts to assess what 
people see as crucial moral issues in a situation by 
presenting subjects with a moral dilemma and a list of 
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definitions of the major issues involved" (Rest, 1976, 
p. 89). This instrument consists of six moral dilemma 
situations. Each situation is qualitatively different and 
involves a variety of protagonists. Following each 
dilemma are twelve statements which characterize various 
issues that might affect the respondant's decision about 
the course of action to be followed. These twelve issues 
reflect reasoning at moral reasoning levels 2, 3, 4, SA, 
SB, 6. There are no stage 1 items because the reading 
level and general maturity level required to complete the 
instrument are so high that finding stage 1 subjects is 
unlikely. Similarly, there are few stage 2 items because 
most subjects are assumed to reason beyond this stage. 
The stages in which subjects' thinking is expected to 
focus are stages 3, 4, SA, SB and 6, and as a result, the 
items representing reasoning at these stages are in-
cluded. Stages SA and SB represent different facets of 
stage S reas,oning frequently employed by subjects when 
responding to the moral dilemmas comprising the DIT. 
In responding to the DIT, subjects are first required 
to decide the course of action to be followed in resolving 
the moral dilemma. They are then required to rate each of 
the twelve statements representing moral reasoning at 
levels 2, 3,4, SA, SB, and 6 from "great importance" to 
"no importance" in respect to the decision made to resolve 
the moral dilemma. Finally subjects identify and rank the 
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four most important issues in respect to the decision made 
to resolve the dilemma. 
Each of the four issues identified and ranked in 
importance in respect to the decision made to resolve the 
di lemma is weighted as follows: f .irst choice, 4 points; 
second choice, 3 points; third choice, 2 points; fourth 
choice, 1 point. The stage scores for moral reasoning 
levels 2, 3, 4 SA, 5B and 6 are then calculated by summing 
the scores for the four issues identified most important 
by moral reasoning level across all six dilemmas. The 
P-score, which represents reasoning at the principled 
morality levels, represent the stage score sum for levels 
SA, 5B and 6. The% P-score is derived by dividing the 
P-score by the total number of possible points on the 
entire test. 
In order to establish the validity of this instrument 
Rest provides seven types of logical and empirical 
evidence: 
1. Criterion group validity. Criterion group 
validity refers to the ability of an instrument to provide 
differential scores for groups of subjects who logically 
would be expected to have different scores. In order to 
establish the criterion group validity of the DIT, Rest 
(1976) collected data from 50 studies on 5,714 subjects in 
136 different samples. Examination of these data suggest 
that subjects with differing educational levels show 
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significantly discriminant DIT scores. Rest contends that 
subjects' DIT scores should be positively correlated with 
educational level since both indices tap cognitive 
development in general. Thus, if subjects at different 
educational levels evidence differential DIT performance, 
evidence for criterion group validity is provided. These 
data are summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Student Group Averages on DIT P-Scores 
Group n Average P% 
Junior high 1322 21.9 
Senior high 381 31.8 
College 2,479 42.3 
Graduate 183 53.3 
2. Convergent-divergent validity. In order to 
establish the validity of an instrument to assess a given 
construct, subjects' performance on the instrument in 
question is correlated on other accepted measures of that 
construct. Such a correlation should be positive. 
Conversely, if the instrument in question is correlated 
with other measures of other, non-related constructs a 
small or negative correlation should result. In order to 
establish the convergent-divergent validity of the DIT, 
Rest (1979) presents several studies which correlated the 
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DIT with performance on Kohlbergian tests of moral 
judgment. These studies, which are summarized in Table 5, 
suggest that the DIT significantly correlates with both 
Kohlberg's and Gibb's measures of moral reasoning. 
Table 5 
Correlations of DIT P-Score with Kohlbergian Tests of 
Moral Judgment 
Sample n Measure 
1 45 Kohlberg's 1976 Scoring 
2 91 Kohlberg's 1972 Issue Scoring 
3 41 Gibbs' Scales 
4 47 Kohlberg's 1958 Scoring 







3. Longitudinal validity. With any construct that 
postulates a natural developmental course, it is impera-
tive to assess subjects across the variable of time. In 
order to establish the longitudinal validity of the DIT, 
Rest provides data which offers at least weak support for 
the longitudinal validity of the DIT. These data, which 
are summarized in Table 6, indicate that in five of the 
six studies cited by Rest (1979), mean P-score increased, 
suggesting the presence of a natural developmental course 
across the variable of time. 
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Table 6 
Two-Year Changes in DIT P-Scores 
Mean P-Score 
Group n Time 1 Time 2 
1 15 32.7 48.2 
2 23 36.0 43.9 
3 11 42.0 39.2 
4 18 29.5 36.8 
5 8 36.9 42.3 
6 10 25.0 34.4 
4. Validation through experimental enhancement 
studies. Rest suggests that the validity of the DIT can 
be demonstrated by identifying experiences or learning 
conditions that are especially enhancing to the construct 
of moral development. Subjects are then exposed to those 
experiences and "pre-post" gains on the instrument are 
assessed. While several intervention studies have been 
completed, Rest identifies a study completed by Balkcum 
(1979) as offering validation through enhancement. 
Subjects were undergraduates aged 17 to 44 in a two-year 
general arts and sciences college. Seventy-three had 
enrolled in an ethics course and 28 had enrolled in a 
logic course. The DIT was administered before and after 
the course. As a test of logic the Cornell Critical 
Thinking Test (CCTT) was used. The ethics course gave 
students a concentrated experience in solving complex 
moral dilemmas, while the logic course was aimed at 
developing rigorous and systematic thinking. Table 7 
presents group means of the pre and post tests for both 
groups on both measures. 
Table 7 
Means on Pre and Post Test of the DIT and CCTT in the 
Ethics and Logic Classes 
DIT CCTT 
Pre Post t Pre Post 
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t 
Ethics class 41:-6° 46.5 2 .06* 43.8 44.7 1.88 
Logic class 40.1 46.5 1.12 44.8 47.5 2.17* 
*p < . 05. 
The data indicate that the ethics class went up on the DIT 
but not on the logic test, whereas the logic class went up 
on the logic test but not on the DIT. 
6. Psychometric reliability. In order for an 
instrument to be a valid instrument it must have demon-
strated reliability. Table 8 presents the data offered by 
Davison (1979) to establish the test-retest reliability of 
the DIT. 
Table 8 
Test-Retest Correlation Coefficients of the P-Scores on 
the DIT 
n P-Score Time Interval -
Sample 1 
Test 123 40.78 5 mo. 
Retest 44.93 
Sample 2 
Test 19 36.48 1 mo. 
Retest 35.78 
Sample 3 
Test 33 41.37 1 mo. 
Retest 41. 77 
Davison (1979) also reports the following range of 
test-retest reliabilities for the DIT stage scores (N = 
19-123). 
Stage 2, r = .30 - .70; Stage 3, r = .32 - .52; 
Stage 4, r = .27 .74; Stage SA, r = .53 • 59; -






It is important to note that the test-retest relia-
bilities of the stage scores vary considerably. This lack 
of consistency may be due in part to the small sample 
sizes or may reflect an underlying lack of stage unity or 




This study was conducted early in the semester prior 
to any lectures on cognitive or moral development in order 
that subjects' performance on the Defining Issues Test 
might not be affected by exposure to the theories of Jean 
Piaget or Lawrence Kohlberg. 
The 300 subjects were administered the Defining 
Issues Test with the standard instructions supplied in the 
test manual. All subjects were administered the DIT 
simultaneously; monitors were present during the test 
administration. Subjects were allowed an unlimited time 
to complete the DIT. No subject took longer than 70 
minutes to complete the instrument. 
A combination of machine and hand-scoring was used to 
score the DIT protocols. Percent P-scores and P-scores 
were obtained through machine scoring of the DIT proto-
cols. Issue ranking totals were obtained through hand 




In order to assess the relationship between the 
variables of dilemma and moral development level, the 
frequencies for each level of moral reasoning cited as 
most i mportant in each of the six dilemmas in deciding the 
course of action to be followed for the 300 students 
administered the Defining Issues Test were calculated. 
These frequencies are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9 
Freguency of Level of Reasonin9: Cited as Most Important 
Defining 
Issues Test Level of Moral Reasonin9 
Dilemma 2 3 4 SA SB 6 Total 
1 25 104 19 54 0 18 220 
2 13 39 86 71 22 18 249 
3 31 47 21 54 27 38 218 
4 0 54 83 89 9 5 240 
5 52 15 153 23 0 5 248 
6 23 18 141 53 28 3 266 
Total 144 277 503 344 86 87 1441 
Row totals do not sum to 300 since some subjects 
selected meaningless but complex-sounding items, i.e., "M" 
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items, as the most important issue in deciding the course 
of action to be followed in resolving the dilemma. Thus 
the total 220 in row 1 indicates that 80 subjects selected 
the "M" i tern on Dilemma 1. 
The zero entries in Table 9 indicate that reasoning 
at a given level was not present for a given dilemma. 
Thus the zero in column 1 indicates that there were no 
level 2 statements for dilemma four. 
A 6x6 chi-square analysis was performed on these 
frequencies to analyze the relationship between dilemma 
and moral development level of responses (Stages 2, 3, 4, 
SA, SB, and 6) on the Defining Issues Test. Since the 
obtained JL 2 = 25 (N = 300) = 478.1, E < .01, non-inde-
pendence between the variables of dilemma and moral 
reasoning level is indicated. 
In order to evaluate independence within a stage 
level across dilemmas, further tests were performed. Thus 
the initial 6x6 contingency table was divided into six lx6 
tables, one for each of the moral reasoning levels. The 
obtained _'f 2s are reported in Table 10. 
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Table 10 
Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit Test for DIT Dilemma's X Level 
of Reasoning 
Level of 
Reasoning 2 df 
2 62.0* 5 
3 78.3* 5 
4 129.6* 5 
SA 41.9* 5 
SB 47.7* 5 
6 42.9* 5 
*E < .001. 
Since significant differences were found between the 
expected and observed frequencies for all 6 levels of 
moral reasoning. The presence of a relationship between 
dilemma and moral reasoning level is supported. 
Because some stages were unrepresented or unequally 
represented in some dilemmas, from the original 6 DIT 
moral dilemmas, the 4 dilemmas which included issues 
representing moral reasoning at levels 2, 3, 4, SA and 6 
were identified. There were the Heinz, Student, Webster 
and Doctor dilemmas. Issue rankings for these dilemmas 
were scored as follows: great importance, 5; much 
importance, 4; some importance, 3; little importance, 2; 
no importance, 1. The issue rankings for the Heinz, 
Student, Webster and Doctor dilemmas summed for the moral 
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reasoning levels 2, 3, 4, SA and 6 are reported in Table 
11. Means and standard deviations for these summed issue 
rankings are reported in Table 12. 
Table 11 
Sum of Weighted Issue Rankin the Heinz, Student, 
Webster, and Doctor •Dilemmas 255 
Level of Reasoning 
2 3 4 SA 6 
Heinz 804 840 686 690 754 
Student 737 793 830 748 743 
Webster 874 706 860 658 579 
Doctor 476 799 833 874 770 
Table 12 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations ( SD) of Weighted Issue 
Rankings for the Heinz, Student, Webster and Doctor 
Dilemmas {N = 255) 
Level of Reasoning 
2 3 4 5 6 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Heinz 3.74 1.75 3.91 1.22 3.19 1.01 3 .21 1.10 3.51 1.16 
Student 3.43 0.75 3.68 1.09 3.86 1.11 3.48 1.04 3.46 1.1 
Webster 4.07 0.57 3.28 1.17 4.00 1.00 3.06 1.12 2.69 1.13 
Doctor 2.21 1.14 3.72 1.27 3.87 1.16 4.07 1.03 3.58 1.05 
Hartley's F-maximum test performed to test the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance among the 20 
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treatment conditions was not significant (F (20,214) -max 
= .89, p > .OS). These data were then analyzed in a 4x5 
analysis of variance with repeated measures on both 
factors. The analysis of variance for repeated measures 
on the issue rankings for the Heinz, Student, Webster and 
Doctor dilemma across moral reasoning levels 2, 3, 4, SA 
and 6 indicated a significant dilemma effect, F (3,642) = 
31.5, E_ < .001, a significant moral reasoning level 
effect, F (4,856) = 81.5, E < .001, and a significant 
dilemma by moral reasoning level interaction. ~ (12,2568) 
= 33.5, E < .001, which indicates that dilemmas differen-
tially elicited different levels of moral reasoning from 
subjects. The analysis of variance summary is presented 
in Table 13. 
Table 13 
Summary of 5x4 Analysis of Variance of Issue Rankings for 
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A Tukey (A) procedure test for multiple comparisons 
applied to the issue rankings, totals associated with the 
levels of moral reasoning reveals that: 
1. the Doctor dilemma elicited significantly less 
Level 2 reasoning than the Student, Heinz or 
Webster dilemma (E < .05). 
2. the Student dilemma elicited significantly less 
Level 2 reasoning than did the Webster dilemma 
(E_< .05). 
3. the Heinz dilemma elicited significantly less 
Level 4 reasoning than did the Student, Heinz or 
Webster dilemmas (E < .05). 
4. the Webster dilemma elicited significantly less 
Level 5 reasoning than did the Doctor Dilemma 
(E_ < .05). 
5. the Heinz dilemma elicited significantly less 
Level 5 reasoning than did the Doctor dilemma 
(E_< .05). 
6. the Webster dilemma elicited significantly less 
Level 6 reasoning than did the Heinz, Student 
and Doctor dilemma (E < .05). 
7. that there were no significant differences in 
ability to elicit Level 3 reasoning among the 
Heinz, Student, Webster and Doctor dilemmas 
(E_> .05). 
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Tukey (A) procedure for multiple comparisons applied 
to the issue ranking totals associated with the four 
dilemmas reveals that: 
1. the Heinz dilemma elicited significantly more 
Level 3 reasoning than it did Level 4 or Level 5 
reasoning. 
2. there were no significant differences in level 
of reasoning elicited on the Student dilemma. 
3. the Webster dilemma elicited significantly less 
Level 5 and Level 6 reasoning than it did 
Level 2, 3 or 4 reasoning~ significantly more 
Level 4 and Level 2 reasoning than Level 3 
reasoning, significantly more Level 2 reasoning 
than Level 3, 4 5 or 6 reasoning. 
4. the Doctor dilemma elicited significantly more 
Level 5 reasoning than Level 2, 3, 4 or 6 level 
reasoning. 
The Tukey (A) tables are presented in Appendix D. 
Performance curves for these data are presented in Figures 
3 and 4. As can be seen in Figures 3 and 4, the four 
dilemmas evidence significantly different profiles. That 
is, each of the dilemmas elicited significantly different 
levels of moral reasoning. The Doctor dilemma elicited 
significantly more level 5 reasoning and significantly 
less level 2 reasoning than did any other dilemma. 
Conversely, the Webster dilemma elicited significantly 
more level 2 reasoning and significantly less level S 
reasoning than did any other dilemma. The Heinz dilemma 
elicited significantly less level 4 reasoning than did 
other dilemmas while the student dilemma elicited fairly 
equal amounts of levels 2, 3, 4, Sand 6 reasoning. 
In order to evaluate subjects' individual profiles, 
ten subjects were randomly selected. These subjects' 
percentages of responses at levels 2, 3, 4, SA, SB and 6 
are presented in Table 14. 
Table 14 
Percentages of Stage Level Responses for Ten Randomly 
Selected - subjects 
Subject 2 3 4 SA SB 
l 4 8 24 28 4 
2 12 20 16 20 12 
3 16 16 28 24 8 
4 4 20 16 32 0 
s 4 8 32 32 0 
6 8 16 20 24 0 
7 12 20 36 12 4 
8 4 8 32 12 0 
9 0 12 28 32 8 













Examination of Table 14 indicates that subjects 
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Figure 3. Sum of issue ranking for levels 2, 3, 4, 5A, 6 across 
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dilemmas across moral reasoning levels 2, 3, 4, 5A, 6. 
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levels of moral reasoning evidence a lesser frequency of 
usage with a gradual decrease in usage as the levels move 
away from the modal response. 
Thus, the individual profiles are consistent with the 
complex stage model. These data, however, do not address 
the assumption of structural whole since the percentages 




Various cognitive developmental models have been 
suggested to explain individuals' reasoning in response to 
moral dilemmas. Kohlberg, the most influential theorist 
in the field, has proposed a simple six-stage model of 
moral reasoning. In Kohlberg's formulation a given 
stage-response on a task does not represent a specific 
response determined by knowledge or familiarity with the 
task. Rather it represents an underlying thought-organi-
zation. These thought organizations, which are qualita-
tively different for each of the six hypothesized stages, 
are the structured wholes of cognitive moral stage theory. 
Many researchers have been unable to find empirical 
support for the underlying assumption of structured 
whole. Rest, in an attempt to address the sources of the 
empirical anomalies associated with Kohlberg's model, 
developed a complex stage model. In Rest's formulation, a 
subject's responses are hypothesized to evidence a 
consistent probabilistic pattern, i.e., subjects may 
demonstrate more than a single stage of reasoning when 
responding to moral dilemmas, yet this pattern of stages 
offered in response to dilemmas of diverse content should 
be consistent across dilemmas. 
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While Kohlberg and Rest disagree as to the number of 
stages subjects will exhibit in response to moral dilem-
mas, they both hold that the primary determinant of 
subjects' moral reasoning level are innate cognitive 
structures rather than the content of the dilemma or other 
test characteristics or variables. 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the 
validity of the assumption of structured whole, through a 
systematic examination of the pattern of responses offered 
by subjects on the Defining Issues Tests, an instrument 
frequently used to assess moral development. Prior to 
this study little research has been done which specifi-
cally examines the consistency of subjects' responses 
across the variables of dilemma and stage. Such research 
is necessary if the validity of stage theory is to be · 
established. 
Analyses of responses to six dilemmas of diverse 
story content offer no support for the structured whole 
hypothesis of cognitive moral development theory, nor was 
a consistent pattern of stages evident. Subjects offered 
dramatically different levels of moral reasoning in 
response to the dilemmas of the Defining Issues Test. 
Dilemmas appear to "pull for" and/or exclude certain 
levels of moral reasoning differentially. This effect is 
most striking comparing the Doctor dilemma to the Webster 
dilemma. The Doctor dilemma appears to exclude Level 2 
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reasoning while "pulling for" Level 5 reasoning. Con-
versely, the Webster dilemma appears to exclude Level 6 
reasoning while "pulling for" Level 4 reasoning. 
The Student dilemma elicits approximately equal 
amounts of levels 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 reasoning while the 
Heinz dilemma elicits significantly lesser amounts of 
levels 4 and 5 reasoning than level 3 reasoning. When 
performance curves are constructed across dilemmas for 
levels 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, the lack of consistency in story 
"pull" becomes evident. Dilemmas elicit markedly dif-
ferent patterns of moral reasoning. This finding offers 
no support for the assumption of structured whole since 
the presence of underlying thought patterns controlling 
moral reasoning behavior would predict consistent profiles 
across dilemmas. 
In assessing the sources of the lack of support these 
data provide for the assumption of structured wholes, five 
possible factors must be considered: 
1. Scoring Error. In assessing the impact of 
scoring error on the lack of consistency evidenced by 
these data it is necessary to examine the DIT itself. 
Rest claims that the DIT offers several methodological 
advantages over the semi-structured interview typically 
used to assess moral reasoning. One of these is "objec-
tive" scoring which results in both the minimization of 
scores bias and scorer error. As a result of the objec-
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tive nature of the DIT, the effect scoring error can most 
probably be discounted as a source of the lack of consis-
tency in subjects' responses. 
2. Measurement Error. While considerable research 
assessing the psychometric properties of the DIT P-score 
has been completed, only a limited amount of research has 
addressed the question of the reliability of stage 
scores. While the DIT P-score, a measure of subjects' 
reasoning at the principled levels of moral reasoning 
(levels 4, SA, SB and 6) has been reported to exhibit 
test-retest reliabilities in the upper .70's and .80's, 
the stage score reliabilities are considerably lower and 
evidence much more variation. It is also important to 
note that since reliability is also a function of test 
length, it is to be expected that the P-score reliability 
would be higher than the individual stage score relia-
bilities. In order to accurately assess the reliability 
of the test, both the total test and subtest (i.e., stage 
score) reliabilities must be determined with appropriate 
size samples. Since stage score reliabilities have not 
been systematically investigated, the causal agent for the 
lack of consistency in this study must be interpreted 
conservatively. The inconsistency in stage scores across 
dilemmas may be due to either poor stage score reliability 
or to the absence of an underlying cognitive structure or 
to a combination of both effects. 
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3. Fluctuation Due to Situational Variables. 
Situational theorists would argue that lack of consistency 
evidenced in responses is the result of the overwhelming 
influence of cultural and environmental variables. People 
are hypothesized to evidence various levels of reasoning 
as a result of subtle interpretations of the moral dilemma 
which result from and may depend upon many moderating 
variables and/or the interactions of such variables. 
Situational theorists have suggested that some of these 
variables may be related to either situational or person 
variables. Flavell and Wohlwill (1969) have pointed out 
that response variability may stem from differences in 
factors such as the ''stimulus materials and their famil-
iarity, the manner of presentation of the relevant 
information, the amount of information-load placed on the 
child and the role played by the cognitive skills of 
memory and sequential processing of information.'' In 
order to assess which variables impact on moral reasoning 
it is necessary to conduct research in which aspects of 
test stimuli affect the assessment of moral reasoning and 
the degree to which each of these factors affects stage 
scores. 
4. Absence of Underlying Cognitive Structure. If 
an underlying cognitive structure is assessed by a valid 
and reliable instrument, an overall consistency of moral 
reasoning level is to be expected. In interpreting the 
meaning of the lack of consistency and its implications 
for the concept of structured wholes, the following must 
be considered: 
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Cognitive-developmental research suggests that 
subjects are particularly likely to evidence inconsistent 
responding when they are in transitional stages, i.e., 
periods of acquiring a new structure. It is during this 
transitional phase that inconsistencies are to be ex-
pected. Thus the lack of ,consistency in a given subject's 
responses at a single point in time is not enough to call 
into question the concept of structure whole from the 
perspective of either simple stage theory or complex stage 
theory. 
However, since these data report -the responses of 255 
subjects, an overall consistent pattern of response should 
have been evident if structured whole is a valid under-
lying assumption. It is important to note that these 255 
subjects as a group may be in transition. As undergradu-
ates in the age range 18 to 24, such transitional reason-
ing might be expected. 
5. Lack of Content Validity of DIT Items. Lack of 
consistency in subjects' responses on the DIT may be due 
to the lack of content validity of the DIT items them-
selves. Rest offers no empirical or theoretical support 
for the content validity of items. In order to establish 
this validity, the DIT must be evaluated by experts in the 
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fields of psychology, moral philosophy or theology. 
Further, a factor analysis or cluster analysis would add 
additional data by which to assess the content validity of 
individual items. 
Inspection of Table 14 suggests that subjects do not 
evidence a unitary stage response, rigorously excluding 
reasoning at any other level. Subjects appear to evidence 
a modal response with the next higher and lower stages 
evidencing a higher frequency of usage than stages further 
removed from the modal stage. Thus these data do offer 
some support for the presence of a systematic progression 
of moral reasoning stages where the attainment, maximum 
utilization and rejection of stages are predicted to yield 
a set of overlapping bell-shaped curves. As a result, 
Rest's complex stage model for moral reasoning is provided 
some support. 
In summary, the findings of this study do not support 
the presence of an underlying cognitive structure 
cross-cutting all moral dilemmas. The validity of t h e 
structured whole assumption is questioned. Subjects 
appear to reason differentially with certain dilemmas 
eliciting significantly higher or lower reasoning than 
other dilemmas. This finding offers some support to the 
contention of situational theor l sts that the character-
istics of the dilemma significantly affect the reasoning 
offered by individuals. Individuals' reasoning on one 
moral task may not be used unitarily as a predictor for 
reasoning on another. 
Limited evaluation of individual subjects' patterns 
of responses on the DIT offers some support for the 
complex stage model of moral reasoning. Additional 
research in the following three areas is necessary in 
order that the underlying assumptions of cognitive 
developmental theory be further investigated: 
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1. Determination of the Test-Retest Reliability of 
the DIT Stage Scores. Since the absence or presence of 
consistency in stage scores is the crux of the issue, the 
instrument used to assess stage score must be a valid and 
reliable measure of stage score. Thus additional research 
must be undertaken to determine the psychometric proper-
ties of the DIT stage scores. 
2. Profile Analysis of Subject's Response on the 
DIT. In order to assess whether the complex stage model 
accurately represents moral reasoning, a profile analysis 
should be conducted to determine the match between the 
theory and empirical data. 
3. Finally, research is necessary to clarify which 
variables impact upon moral reasoning. Consideration must 
be given to both subject and dilemma variables and 
possible interaction of these variables. 
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CF IN IONS ABOUT SOC IAL PROBLEMS 
This questionnaire Is aimed at understanding how people think about soclal 
problems. Different people often have different opinions about questions of right and 
wrong. There are no "right" answers In the way that there are right answers to math 
problems. We would llke you to tel I us what you think about several problem stories. 
The papers wll I be fed to a computer to find the average for the whole group, and no one 
wll I see your lndlvldual answers. 
Please give us the fol lowln_g Information: 
Name female ---------------------- ----Age Class and period _________________ male 
School 
* * * * * * * 
In th Is quest I onna I re you w 11 I be asked to g Ive your op In Ions about severa _I 
stories. Here Is a story as an example. Read It, then turn to the next page. 
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He Is married, has two smal I 
chlldren and earns an average Income. The car he buys wlll be his family's only car. 
It wll I be used mostly to get to work and drive around town, but sometimes for vacation 
trips also. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones real !zed that there were a 
lot of questions to consider. On the next page there Is a 11st of some of these 
questions. 
If you were Frank Jones, how Important would each of these questions be In 
deciding what car to buy? 
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PART A, CSAWLE) 
On the left hand side of the page check one of the spaces by each question that could be 
considered, 
GREAT MUCH SOME LlffiE NO 
lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- Impor-




I. Whether the car dealer was In the same block as 
where Frank lives. 
2, Wou Id a used car be more econom I ca I In the I ong 
run than a new car. 
3, Whether the color was green, Frank's favorite 
color. 
X 4. Whether the cubic Inch displacement was at least 
X 5, 
200, 
Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact 
car. 
X 6, Whether the front were differential. -----
PART B. CSAWLE) 
From the I 1st of questions above, select the most Important one of the whole group. Put 
the number of the most Important question on the top line below, Do likewise for your 
2nd, 3rd and 4th most Important choices, 
Most Important 
Second most Important 
Th I rd most Important 





HEINZ AND THE DRUG 
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that 
the doctors thought might save her. ft was a form of radium that a druggist In the same 
town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was 
charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged 
$2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone 
he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1000, which Is half 
of what It cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sef I It 
cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm 
going to make money from It." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking 
Into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. 
Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one) 
Shou I d stea I It 
Can't decide 
Should not steal It 
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HEINZ STORY 
On the left hand side of the page check one of the spaces by each question to 
Indicate Its Importance, 
GREAT MUCH SOME LITTLE NO 
lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- Impor-
tance tance tance tance tance 
I. Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld, 
2. Isn't It only natural for a loving husband to 
care so much for his wife that he's steal? 
3, Is 1-elnz wllllng to risk getting shot as a 
burglar or going to jal I for the chance that 
stealing the drug might help? 
_______________ 4. Whether Heinz Is a professional wrestler, or has 
consider Influence with professional wrestlers. 
5, Whether Heinz Is stealing for himself or doing 
this solely to help someone else, 
6, Whether the druggist's rights to his Invention 
have to be respected, 
7. Whether the essence of living Is more 
encompassing than the termination of dying, 
socially and Individually. 
8, What values are going to be the basis for 
governing how people act towards each other. 
9, Whether the druggist Is going to be al lowed to 
hide behind a worthless taw which only protects 
the rich anyhow. 
_______________ 10, Whether the law In this case Is getting In the 
way of the most basic claim of any member of 
society. 
11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for 
being so greedy and cruel. 
_______________ 12. Would stealing In such a case bring about more 
total good for the whole society or not, 
From the list of questions above, select the four most Important: 
Most Important 
Second most Important 
Th I rd most Important 
Fourth most Important 
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STUDENT AKE-OVER 
At Harvard University a group of students, cal led the Students for a Democratic 
Society (SOS), believe that the University should not have an army ROTC program. SOS 
students are against the war In Viet Nam, and the army training program helps send men 
to fight In Viet Nam. The SOS students demanded that Harvard and the army ROTC training 
program as a university course. This would mean that Harvard students could not get 
army training as part of their regular course work and not get credit for It towards 
the Ir degrees. 
Agreeing with the SOS students, the Harvard professors voted to end the ROTC 
program as a university course. But the President of the University stated that he 
wanted to keep the army program on campus as a course. The SOS students felt that the 
President was not going to pay attention to the faculty vote or to their demands. 
So, one day last Aprl I, two hundred SOS students walked Into the university's 
administration building and told everyone else to get out. They said they were doing 
this to force Harvard to get rid of the army training program as a course. 
Should the students have taken over the administration bul !ding? (Check one) 
Yes, they should take It over 
Can't decide 
No, they should not take It over 
GREAT MUCH SOME LI TILE NO 
lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- Impor-
tance tance tance tance tance 
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STUDENT TAKE-OVER 
I • N-e the students do! ng th! s to really help other 
people or are they doing It for kicks. 
2. Do the students have any right to take over 
property that doesn't belong to them. 
3. Do the students realize that they might be 
arrested and fined, and even expelled from school. 
4. Would taking over the building In the long run 
benefit more people to a greater extent. 
5. Whether the president stayed within the I lmlts of 
his authority In Ignoring the faculty vote. 
6. W 111 the takeover anger the pub I Jc and g Ive a 11 
students a bad name. 
7. Is taking over a building consistent with 
principles of justice. 
8. Would al lowing one student take-over encourage 
many other student take-overs. 
_______________ 9. Did the president .bring this misunderstanding on 
himself by being so unreasonable and 
uncooperative. 
10. Whether running the university ought to be In the 
hands of a few administrators or In the hands of 
al I the people. 
I I. N-e the students fol !owing principles which they 
be 11 eve are above the I aw. 
12. Whether or not university decisions ought to be 
respected by students. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most Important: 
Most Important 
Second most Important 
Th I rd most Important 
Fourth most Important 
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ESCAPED PRISONER 
A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he 
escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of 
Thompson. For 8 yea·rs he worked hard, and gradua 11 y he saved enough money to buy h Is 
own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most 
of his own profits to charity. Then one day Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, recognized him 
as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before and whom the police had been 
look Ing for. 
Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison? 
< Check one> 
Should report him 
Can't decide 
Should not report him 
GREAT MUCH SOME LITTLE NO 
lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- Impor-
tance tance tance tance tance 
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ESCAPED PRISONER 
I. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a 
long time to prove he Isn't a bad person? 
2. Everytlme someone escapes punt shment for a crime, 
doesn't that Just encourage more crime? 
_______________ 3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and the 
oppression of our legal system? 
4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to society? 
_______________ 5. Would society be falling what Mr. Thompson should 
fairly expect? 
6. What benefits would prisons be apart from 
society, especially for a charitable man? 
______ 7. 1-bw could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to 
send Mr. Thompson to prl son? 
8. Would It be fair to all the prisoners who had to 
serve out their full sentences If Mr. Thompson 
was let of f7 
9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson? 
to. Wouldn't It be a citizen's duty to report an 
escaped citizen, regardless of the circumstances? 
11. 1-bw would the wl 11 of the poop le and the pub-I le 
good best be served? 
12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. 
Thompson or protect anybody? 
From the 11st of questions above, select the four most Important: 
Most Important 
Second most Important 
Th I rd most Important 
Fourth most Important 
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NEW PAPER 
Fred, a senior In high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for 
students so that he could express many of his opinions~ He wanted to speak out against 
the war In Viet Nam and to speak out against some of the school's rules, I Ike the rule 
forbidding boys to wear long hair, 
When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. The 
principal said It would be al I right If before every publication Fred would turn In al I 
his articles for the prlnclpal's approval ~ Fred agreed and turned In several articles 
for approval. The principal approved al I of them and Fred published two Issues of the 
paper In the next two weeks, 
But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive so much 
attention, Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize protests 
against the hair regulation and other school rules, Angry parents objected to Fred's 
opinions. They phoned the principal tell Ing him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and 
should not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered 
Fred to stop publlshlng, He gave a reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the 
operation of the school. 
Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one) 
Should stop It 
Can't decide 
Should not stop It 
ffiEAT MUOi SOME LITTLE NO 
lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- Impor-
tance tance tance tance tance 
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NEWs=>PPER 
I. Is the prlnclpal more responsible to students or 
to parents? 
2. Did the principal give his word that the 
newspaper could be published for a long time, or 
did he just premise to approve the newspaper o~e 
Issue at a time? 
3. 
4. 
Would the students start protesting even more If 
the pr Inc I pa I stopped the newspaper? 
When the welfare of the school Is threatened, 
does the principal have the right to give orders 
to students? 
5. Does the prlnclpal have the freedom of speech to 
say "no" In th Is case? 
6. If the principal stopped the newspaper would he 





Whether the pr! nc I pa I's order wou Id make Fred 
lose faith In the prlnclpa I? 
Whether Fred was really loyal to his school and 
patriotic to his country. 
What effect would stopping the paper have on the 
student's education In critical thinking and 
judgment? 
10. Whether Fred was In any way vlolatlng the rights 
of others In publlshlng his own opinions • 
. I I. Whether the prlnclpal should be Influenced by 
some angry parents when It Is the principal that 
knows best what Is going on In the school. 
12. Whether Fred was using the newspaper to stir up 
the hatred and discontent. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most Important: 
Most Important 
Second most Important 
Th I rd most Important 
Fourth most Important 
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WEBSTER 
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire 
another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. The only person he 
found who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Lee, but he was Chinese. Whlle Mr. 
Webster himself didn't have anything against Orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr, Lee 
because many of his customers didn't like Orienta ls. His customers might take their 
business elsewhere If Mr. Lee was working In the gas station. 
When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster If he could have the job, Mr. Webster said that he 
had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really had not hired anybody, because 
he could not find anybody who was a good mechanic besides Mr. Lee. 
Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one) 
Should have hired Mr. Lee 
O!n't decide 
Should not have hired him 
GREAT MUCH SOt-E LITTLE NO 
lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- Impor-
tance tance tance tance tance 
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WEBSTER 
I. Does the owner of a business have the right to 








Whether there Is a law that forbids racial 
discrimination In hiring for Jobs. 
Whether Mr. Webster Is prejudiced against 
()-fentals himself or whether he means nothing 
persona I In refus Ing the Job. 
Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying 
attention to his customers' wishes would be best 
for his business. 
What Individual differences ought to be relevant 
In deciding how society's roles are fllled7 
Whether the greedy and competitive cap Ital lstlc 
system ought to be completety abandoned. 
Do a majority of people In Mr. Webster's society 
feel like his customers or are a majority against 
prejudice? 
Whether hiring capable men I Ike Mr. Lee would use 
talents that woutd otherwise be lost to society. 
Would refusing the Job to Mr. Lee be consistent 
with Mr. Webster's own moral beliefs? 
10. Could Mr. Webster be so hard-hearted as to refuse 
the Job, knowing how much It means to Mr. Lee7 
I I. Whether the Christian commandment o love your 
fellow man applies to this case. 
12. If someone's In need, shouldn't he be helped 
regardless of what you get back fran hlm7 
From the tlst of questions above, select the four most Important: 
Most Important 
Second most Important 
Third most Important 
Fourth most Important 
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THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA 
A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six 
months to live. She was In terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of 
paln-k 11 ler I Ike morphine would make her die sooner. She was del lrlous and almost crazy 
with pain, and In her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine 
to kll I her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die In a 
few months anyway. 
Should the doctor do7 (Check one) 
1-Je shou Id g Ive the I ady an overdoes that w II I make her d le 
Qm't decide 
Should not give her an overdose 
GREAT MUCH SOME LITTLE NO 
lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- lmpor- Impor-
tance tance tance tance tance 
81 
DOCTOR 
I. Whetherthewoman'sfc111lly Is In favor of giving 
her the overdose or not. 
2. Is the doctor obi I gated by the same I aws as 
everybody else If giving an overdose would be the 
same as kl I I Ing her. 
3. Whether people would be much better off without 
society regimenting their lives and even their 
deaths. 







Does the state have the right to force continued 
ex I stance on those who don I t want to t Ive. 
What Is the value of death prior to society's 
perspective on personal values. 
Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman's 
suffering or cares more about what society might 
think. 
Is helping to end another's life ever a 
responsible act of cooperation. 
Whether only God should decide when a person's 
I lfe should end. 
10. What values the doctor has to let anybody end 
their lives when they want to. 
II. Can society afford to let anybody end their lives 
when they want to. 
12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and 
still protect the lives of Individuals who want 
to I Ive. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most Important: 
Most Important 
Second most Important 
Third most Important 




Defining Issues Test Standard Test Instructions 
Please read the co '>-er sheet of the Opinions About Social Problems. 
If you have any questions please ask. ~n this questionnaire you will 
be asked to give your opinions about several stories. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Please turn t c the first page and begin. 
Table D-I 
Tukey Procedure Associated with Levels of Moral Reasoning for 
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Tukey Procedure Associated with Defining Issues Test DIiemmas for 
Levels of Reasoning Issue Ranking Totals 
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Webster DI lemma R 
Level 6 579 
Level 5 658 
Level 3 706 
Level 4 860 
Level 2 874 
q 
k, .95 Ck, 
Cn ms )(q .95 k, 
error 
*.e. .05. 
Doctor D I I emma . R 
Level 2 476 
Level 6 770 
Level 3 799 
Level 4 833 
Leve I 5 874 
q 
k, .95 Ck, 
C n ms ) (q .95 k, 
error 
*.e. .05. 
Level 6 Level 5 Level 3 Level 4 Level 2 
19 
Level 2 Level 6 
294* 
127 
48 
Level 3 
323* 
29 
281* 
202* 
295* 
216* 
154* 168* 
3.86 
143.86 
Level 4 
357* 
63 
34 
3.86 
143.86 
16 
Level 5 
398* 
I 04 
75 
41 
88 
